Hu Jintao's recent foreign visits are integral to China's foreign policy strategy of building partnerships around the world. As part of this strategy the Chinese President visited the United States, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Nigeria and Kenya last month. The official Chinese position hailed these visits as an important part of the PRC's diplomatic policies. It said that China attaches considerable importance to relations with developed countries such as the United States, while at the same time giving equal importance to building up traditional friendly ties with developing countries thus injecting a new energy into South-South co-operation. This overarching strategy of building partnerships is motivated by the principal goal of maintaining a peaceful environment to support China's internal growth and domestic stability. While China's foreign policy objectives are indeed driven by domestic considerations, its proactive policies indicate a fundamental shift in its foreign policy, which is intended to create an international system favourable to itself and in which the United States would no longer be the sole super power.
Most analyses on Hu Jintao's visit to the US have portrayed it as inconclusive. On the three thorny issues from the US point of view - the North Korea nuclear impasse, the Iran nuclear programme and the US-China trade deficit - China does not seem to have relented on any. On North Korea, China seems happy with the status quo since any change in that country would affect China's domestic stability. On Iran, China does not want Tehran to go nuclear but it is opposed to any use of sanctions, which would impinge on its energy co-operation with Tehran. On the issue of trade deficit, China thinks it is "unscientific" to blame it alone and that its policies are mainly driven by the objective of peace at home.
Besides these, China maintains its own stand on other contentious issues as well - Taiwan, human rights and democracy. It staunchly vows to oppose Taiwan's secession from the mainland. For the first time on October 19, 2005, China came out with a White Paper that clarified its position on democracy by stating that democracy should evolve out of local conditions, should have local characteristics, and should cater to local needs. On human rights, China retorts back with its own criticisms of the US human rights position. China thus firmly opposes Western or US intervention and is unwilling to toe the Bush line. Instead, its foreign policy pronouncements on most contentious issues indicate that it has emerged as a confident power intent on setting its own rules in the international system.
Indeed, instead of calling itself a mere "stakeholder," as the US Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick did while described China's role in the international system, the Chinese President prefers to describe his country as a "partner" in constructive co-operation. Hu Jintao stated that China and the US "shared extensive and important strategic interests in safeguarding world peace and promoting mutual development." The Chinese Foreign Minister, Li Zhaoxing, hailed Hu's visit to the US as "carrying the constructive and cooperative relations between the two countries to a new stage." This new stage is marked by China's partnership with the US in promoting peace and stability in the world. China's April 2006 six-point proposal on bilateral ties with the United States underlined that "the two sides should maintain close consultation, take up challenges and strengthen communication and coordination on major international and regional issues." Hu's US visit should therefore be viewed not as aimed at achieving a breakthrough on any contentious issue but as a "crisis coping" strategy whereby China intends to play its leadership role in guiding global developments.
The elevation of China to the status of a global player is similarly evident in Hu's Afro-Asian tour to Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Nigeria and Kenya right after his US visit. China is seeking to build a "strategic partnership" with Africa, which has added a new dimension to the emerging Sino-African ties. In fact, some scholars are talking about a "great game" being enacted in Africa between China and the US for access to natural resources. As opposed to the "Washington Consensus" typified by political liberalisation and economic reforms, China is seeking to create a kind of "Beijing Consensus" based on common development, strong belief in sovereignty, multilateralism and the principle of non-interference. Joshua Cooper Ramo, a former Foreign Editor of Time magazine who coined the term 'Beijing Consensus', sees its emergence in new attitudes to politics, development and the global balance of power.
Based on this consensus, Beijing unveiled an African Policy Paper on January 12, 2006 entitled 'China's African Policy,' which states that "China will do its best to provide and gradually increase assistance to African nations with no political strings attached." On the issue of military co-operation, the policy paper outlined that China "will continue to help train African military personnel and support defence and army building of African countries for their own security." Hu's visits to the African nations were thus intended to advance "strategic partnerships" formulated in April 2005, broadly based on mutual political trust, mutual economic benefit and mutual assistance in international affairs. China signed twenty-eight accords with the four countries, covering politics, security, economy and trade, energy, education, health system, culture and tourism. Given that China does not dictate terms for political or economic reforms and only expects affirmation of the 'one China' policy, it is all the more welcome to African countries.
An assessment of Hu's recently concluded foreign tour suggests that China's foreign policy is essentially guided by the notion of harmonious development. It was in fact Hu Jintao who first put forward this notion at the United Nations 60th Anniversary Summit on September 15, 2005. It may be recalled that this notion has a striking similarity to the basic concepts of the controversial term - 'peaceful rise'. Chinese sources have enumerated some reasons behind the formulation of this new notion. First, it mainly germinated as a result of hegemony, which challenged peace and development of the contemporary world. Second, the idea of harmonious development is intrinsic to China's internal growth and domestic stability. Third, with this ideology in perspective, China seeks to promote its national interests. China has realised that economic strength alone would not propel it into the category of a major world power, for which purpose it should also be able to formulate rules for the international community. By formulating this notion of harmonious development, China seeks to portray itself as a responsible, confident and constructive power. Embedded in this notion are China's aspirations for a leadership role in international affairs.
China's proactive foreign policy strategy is thus aimed at not only protecting its security interests, but also at shaping its security environment conducive to its national interests and growth. This strategy seeks to build up an alternative international order, which would distinctly pose a formidable challenge to US unilateralism and global hegemony. It also provides a new vision to developing countries, which wish to move away from the US-dominated world order to an alternative international order characterised by the "Beijing Consensus". Chinese foreign policy seems to be determinedly moving towards creating such a consensus. It is to be seen how the future unravels and whether China really emerges as an alternative power centre.
Indonesia and Australia have been at diplomatic loggerheads on the issue of granting political asylum to 42 Papuan refugees who sailed into Australia's Cape York Peninsula in January 2006. While Australia has granted them temporary visas, Indonesia has been asking for their repatriation. Papua has been projected as the next East Timor by Australia and this has become an issue for the Indonesian authorities as Papua has rich mineral resources and Indonesia would not like to have Papua go the East Timor way. The Papuan freedom struggle has been led by the Free Papua Movement (OPM), the two main issues being discrimination by Indonesian authorities and the extensive exploitation of its resources by the Louisiana based Freeport McMoRan Copper and Gold Company. Papua, previously known as Irian Jaya, is a Melanesian, predominantly Christian populated, territory whose people and culture resemble that of Papua New Guinea, which lies on its east. Freeport has been operating in the region for more than three decades and has contributed substantially to the Indonesian treasury to the tune of US$33 billion to date. It is Indonesia's largest taxpayer and employs 18,000 workers and has done health and welfare work in Papua but is also held responsible for the atrocities committed on the Papuan people.
Indonesia won sovereignty over Papua, then called West Irian, through the New York Agreement with the Dutch in 1962. Trouble began soon thereafter following the 1969 'Act of Free Choice' integration referendum under UN auspices that involved just 1,000 handpicked tribal leaders and was widely labelled a sham by Papuan leaders. Nonetheless, West Irian was recognised as part of Indonesia. Papuan resistance to Indonesian authority emerged soon after the transfer of administrative control. OPM was formed in 1964 and the first substantial revolt took place in Manokwari the following year. Mining activities were started by Freeport in Papua in the late 1960s with the full support of the Suharto government. The lack of development and infrastructure aggravated the problems between the Indonesian government and the Papuan populace. Riots broke out in March 1996 in the mining camps of Tembagapura and Timika. In order to assuage anti-Freeport feelings, the company started a scheme in 1997 to provide one per cent of the mine's revenues to the seven local tribes of Papua but the distribution of money has been mired in controversies. In order to counter growing dissension, the Indonesian Parliament passed a bill in 1999, which divided Papua into three provinces - Papua, Central Irian Jaya and West Irian Jaya.
Freeport has been paying the Indonesian military (TNI) for protecting its interests in the wake of these intensified protests, but the amounts were disclosed only in 2002-03 after the deaths of two American school teachers and their Indonesian colleague in an ambush on the road to the mine, which raised questions about the company's relationship with the military. Though individual payment records were withheld by the company, Global Witness, a London based investigative organisation working in the field of exposing the nexus between natural resource exploitation and human rights abuses, was able to obtain these records. In order to save themselves from further embarrassment, Freeport and the Trikora regional military command signed an agreement to secure government designated vital national assets including Freeport. On January 27, 2006, the Indonesian government passed a decree which provides a specific legal basis for corporate assistance to government security forces guarding both the Grasberg mine and Exxon Mobil's gas fields in Aceh.
The Grasberg mine has produced 16.1 billion pounds of copper and 23.3 million ounces of gold since 1988 and the mine's reserves are currently estimated at more than 40 billion pounds of copper and 46 million ounces of gold. In spite of the fact that the world's richest mine is located in Papua, the condition of the local populace has not improved over the years. Student-led protests in April 2006 saw four policemen, one air force personnel and a protester beaten up and stoned to death. Despite the violent protests, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono refused to accept the protestors' demand that the Grasberg mine be closed.
Other actors are also jumping into the fray. Amien Rais, one-time presidential candidate and founder of the National Mandate Party, has raised objections to the existence of Freeport in Indonesia. Indonesian nationalism in recent years has become increasingly linked to US actions around the world, perceived as attacks on Islam. Freeport and Exxon are seen as prime targets since they are American companies.
Freeport has proposed to redistribute the royalty of $1.1 billion from this year. Papua is assured of a meagre $65 million but even this money is to be routed through the finance ministry in Jakarta, which is not acceptable to the Papuans. The ongoing protests might jeopardise British Petroleum's (BP) 24 trillion cubic feet Tangguh gas field project, which would reach its full production capacity in 2016. The problem can be defused through active engagement of the various actors involved, including the protestors, Australia, Freeport and Indonesia. The mostly roadless territory of Papua needs infrastructure and empowerment of the village councils so that grievances could be addressed. Moreover, the TNI needs to be restrained from taking action against Papuans at the behest of the company.
Efforts have been made by both Australia and Indonesia to defuse the crisis, while an umbrella organisation of Papuan independence groups has also shown interest in seeking a peaceful solution. The Indonesian president has also shown keenness to enter into negotiations as a way out of the diplomatic and political impasse in Papua. The most likely negotiator could be the Crisis Management Initiative (CMI), which earlier played a key role in mediating the peace settlement in Aceh. The whole process has been kept under wraps so as not to activate the security hardliners in the TNI or the Indonesian parliament. The special autonomy proposal of the Indonesian government has not drawn a favourable response from the Papuan people and so there is need for constructive engagement without hampering the interests of the parties involved.
In the overall perspective, it can be said that with regard to negotiations with Papua, the Indonesian government would not like to concede as much as it did with the Aceh rebels in August 2005. Aceh was granted 70 per cent of the oil and gas revenues apart from partial self-rule. In contrast, given Papua's abundant natural resources as well as the fact that the Papuan resistance movement is comparatively much weaker, the Indonesian government would likely limit itself to offering a certain percentage of royalties from mining to the locals and to instituting a provincial council to mediate upon contentious issues.
During his four-day visit to the United States from April 18 to 21, 2006, President of the People's Republic of China (PRC) Hu Jintao attended a dinner hosted by Microsoft founder Bill Gates, visited the Boeing plant at Seattle, met President George W. Bush at the White House, attended a dinner hosted by US business firms like Wal-Mart, General Motors, Citigroup and Walt Disney and addressed the Yale University in New Haven. While bilateral economic and trade issues dominated this visit, an uneasy partnership is evolving between the two countries on issues related to global and regional challenges, political issues and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
The context of the visit provides for some interesting insights into the dynamics of the US-China relations. Firstly, this is the first such visit by Hu after assuming all the top positions of political and military power in China. Although, American and Chinese leaders met several times at different fora, official bilateral visits have been few. US Presidents visited China 10 times: in 1972 (Nixon), 1975 (Ford), 1979 (Carter), 1984 (Reagan), 1989 (Bush Sr.), 1997 (Clinton), 1998 (Clinton), 2001 (Bush for the APEC meeting at Shanghai), 2002 (Bush), and in 2005 (Bush). High-level Chinese leaders made seven visits to the US during this period: Deng Xiaoping as Vice Premier in 1979, Premier Zhao Ziyang in 1984, President Li Xiannian in 1985, President Jiang Zemin in 2002, Premier Wen Jiabao in 2002, Hu Jintao first as Vice President in 2002 and now as President in 2006.
Secondly, China's assumption of the presidency of the United Nations Security Council in April 2006 gives it a certain leverage on issues that are a cause of discomfort for the US. These are related to Iran's nuclear programme, Sudan and human rights. While China has not used its veto power in UNSC on issues other than Taiwan, it has the potential to block any sanctions or use of force on other countries.
Thirdly, the recent period has been witness to a schism in US and Chinese policies towards the other. Chinese policy is in the process of a gradual transformation from the economy as focus to contesting, in various degrees, US "hegemony and power politics" in Asia and beyond. China has assiduously worked to build coalitions in Asia, Africa and South America to keep the US influence away and enhance its own position and leadership. Recently concluded sessions of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and the East Asian Summit, Sino-Russian joint exercises, and the like, point towards this direction. On the US side, high-level officials like Secretary of State Rice and Secretary of Defence Rumsfeld have expressed concerns on the growing Chinese military might and its possible impact on the US in Asia or other regions. A month before Hu's visit, Rice, during a trip to Australia, expressed "concern" over Chinese military capabilities. Rumsfeld criticized, at his speech in Singapore in June 2005, the Chinese defence budget hike though no country threatens China. The recent assessments of US National Security Strategy and Quadrennial Defence Review advocated the necessity to follow a "hedge" strategy against a possible superpower in China. The latest strategy envisages redeployments of US assets and refurbishments at Guam and in Asia. On the other hand, reflecting the strengthening of its "engagement" policy, the US has upgraded interactions with China. The US dialogue with China has intensified, though this has been downgraded with other Asian countries. These include "senior dialogues" by Deputy Secretary of State Zoellick, Treasury Department, Departments of State and Energy in the recent period. Indeed, Zoellick, Rice and others have argued in favour of incorporating China within the ambit of US strategy if China behaves as a "responsible stakeholder in the international system."
Fourthly, in order to placate the US, China has announced multi-billion dollar deals. In general, China has followed such tactics to woo Western countries by giving "concessions" such as in business deals, releasing dissidents or announcing counter proliferation measures. Accordingly, a week before Hu's visit, China purchased nearly US$16 billion of American goods, including 80 Boeing aircraft (worth about $4.6 billion), agricultural and IT products. During his stopover at Seattle, Hu mentioned that China is planning to purchase about 2,000 planes in the next 15 years. This is probably a response to calls for bridging the Chinese trade surplus with the US worth about $202 billion in 2005. While Taiwan's Legislative Yuan is yet to clear a pending bill to buy $18 billion worth arms from the US, China appeared to be wooing the most appealing of all among US interests - multibillion dollar business deals. Also, before embarking on his US visit, Hu hosted a red-carpet ceremony to visiting Kuomintang leader Lien Chen and called for resuming "talks [with Taiwan] on an equal footing as soon as possible" and reminded him of the 1992 consensus on "one China". This is in response to Taiwan President Chen Shuibian's abolition of the national unification council in February 2006.
Eventually, the meeting between Hu and Bush was not without its usual pinpricks that characterize China's relations with the outside world. Although these were not decisive in affecting bilateral relations, they do point towards underlying tensions. The US downgraded Hu's visit to that of an official "working visit" rather than a state visit. Seventeen Taiwanese protested at Lafayette Park near the White House. Wang Wenyi, a reporter with Epoch Times, protested in the White House lawns against Chinese curbs on the Falun Gong. An announcer at the White House referred to the PRC as Republic of China. Hu, for his part, made critical references to, in his speech at Yale University, "ideological obstacles and prejudices" towards China in the United States.
Discussions between the two leaders indicated further divisions, though they both agreed to enhance bilateral trade and cooperation. Hu said that by this visit Beijing wanted "to enhance dialogues, expand common ground, deepen mutual trust and cooperation and to promote the all-around growth of constructive and cooperative China-U.S. relations in the 21st century." The two countries, according to Hu, share "important common strategic interests" including economic co-operation and trade, security, public health, energy, and environmental protection. Hu argued for a diplomatic solution to the North Korean and Iranian issues "in a manner that benefits both countries."
Though Bush supported "the emergence of China that is peaceful and prosperous, and that supports international institutions," he termed overall relations as "candid and cooperative," which reflected tensions on issues related to Taiwan, limited US access to Chinese markets, currency exchange rate reform, intellectual property rights violations, etc. While opposing any "unilateral changes in the status quo by either side" in the Taiwan Straits, Bush nudged Hu to do more on the North Korean imbroglio, institute freedom of religion, assembly and Internet. These views provide for a wide difference in the respective agendas of the two countries and reflect a certain uneasiness in managing bilateral relations that have been acquiring strategic proportions in the recent period.
Assam, a strategic border state of India, witnessed the influx of migrants since the British period from then East Bengal, now Bangladesh. The influx was largely engineered by the British, given the economic rationale of cheap labour that the migrants provided for the sprawling tea estates in Assam. However, this issue of migration assumed political and communal overtones after independence, and continues to be an issue of concern. Illegal Bangladeshi migration threatens the demographic pattern of Assam, so much so that the majority Assamese community stands threatened of being relegated to minority status.
In a report to the then President of India K R Narayanan dated November 8, 1998, the then Governor of Assam, Lieutenant General (Retd) S K Sinha warned that the illegal Bangladeshi migration influx "poses a grave threat both to the identity of the Assamese people and to our national security. Successive governments at the Centre and in the State have not adequately met this challenge." He insisted that by viewing the illegal migration issue as a largely regional affair, affecting only the state of Assam, policymakers in New Delhi failed to recognize its negative impact on the overall security landscape. This limited view in New Delhi increased the ability of external actors to influence political developments not only in the peripheral states of the Northeast but also created vital destabilizing linkages within India's strategic heartland.
In order to tackle illegal migration into Assam, the Centre set up the Illegal Migration (Determination by Tribunals) Act, 1983 on December 12, 1983 under an act of Parliament. Applicable only to the state of Assam, the IMDT Act provided that anybody settled in Assam before March 25, 1971 was a legal citizen. Significantly, for the rest of India, the cut off date for acquiring Indian citizenship is July 19, 1948. The IMDT Act also laid the onus on the complainant - the police, rather than the accused to prove the latter's citizenship status. (The Foreigner's Act, 1946, in contrast, lays the responsibility on the accused, and not the complainant, to prove his/her citizenship status).
The implementation of the IMDT Act evoked a lot of acrimony in Assam. It was enacted during the turbulent 1983 elections. At that time, the All Assam Students' Union (AASU) leaders, spearheading the Assam Agitation against illegal Bangladeshi migrants, questioned the validity of the 1983 elections. For them, the elections lacked legitimacy as they were held without resolving the illegal migration issue. Subsequently, AASU leaders argued that the political favouritism shown towards the illegal migrants under the IMDT Act rendered it ineffective in dealing with the issue at hand. The leaders of the Assam Agitation were also by and large suspicious of the IMDT Act given that it was enacted by the Hiteshswar Saikia government, which was perceived to be pro-illegal Bangladeshi migrants for its own political gains.
On August 15, 1985, the Assam Accord was signed between the Assam Agitation leaders and the Rajiv Gandhi government at the Centre. The accord stated in Para 5.9 that "the government will give due considerations to certain difficulties expressed by the AASU/AAGSP regarding the implementation of the Illegal Migrants (Determination by Tribunals) Act, 1983." Significantly, the agitation leaders, who under the banner of the Asom Gana Parishad (AGP) formed the government twice, took an ambiguous stand with regard to the annulment of the IMDT Act. Indeed, they did little to remove the difficulties of the Act, which prevented a judicious handling of the migration issue. Yet, an analysis of the ground realities till date reflects the inability of the IMDT Act to effectively identify and deport illegal migrants. As a result, polemics in Assamese civil society increased the demands for scrapping the IMDT Act.
On July 12, 2005, a three judge Bench of the Supreme Court (SC) comprising Chief Justice R C Lahoti, Justice G P Mathur and Justice P K Balasubramanyan ruled that the IMDT Act "created the biggest hurdle and is the main impediment or barrier in identification and deportation of illegal migrants." It held the Act unconstitutional and stated that it contravened Article 355 of the Constitution. Article 355 of the Indian Constitution entrusts upon the Union of India the duty to protect every state against "external aggression and internal disturbances". The SC also stated that the presence of a large number of illegal migrants had a profound negative impact on the Northeast and directed the setting up of fresh tribunals under the Foreigners Act, 1946 and Foreigners (Tribunal Order) 1964. The IMDT Act had a provision for setting up tribunals in different border districts of Assam to decide the cases against illegal infiltrators. However, estimates indicate that there are nearly 250,000 cases pending with the 16 IMDT tribunals. In this context, the Bench of the SC noted that despite the fact that enquiries were initiated in 310,759 cases under the IMDT Act, only 10,015 persons were declared illegal migrants and out of the declared number, only 1,481 were physically expelled as of April 30, 2000. In comparison, West Bengal, which also has a huge influx of illegal Bangladeshi migrants, has deported nearly half a million till date under the Foreigners Act, 1946. Thereafter, a Group of Ministers (GoM) was set up to study the SC's ruling and prescribe a future course of action. The Cabinet Committee on Political Affairs chaired by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh decided on February 10, 2006 to set up tribunals under the Foreigners Act, 1946, for determination of illegal migrants in Assam.
The scrapping of the IMDT Act and implementation of the Foreigners Act, 1946 should bring about an effective management of the illegal migration problem. Official estimates reveal that under the provisions of the Foreigner's Act, 1946, over 300,000 illegal migrants were deported from Assam between 1962 and 1984 (174,349 between 1962-66, 69,174 between 1967-73 and 58,148 between 1974-83). However, from 1983 onwards, after the implementation of the IMDT Act, the number of deportees fell sharply, with just 1,501 being deported in the subsequent 18 years. Thus, re-engagement with the illegal migration issue under provisions of the Foreigner's Act, 1946 should bring about better management of the situation.
It is vital for India's national security to check the influx of illegal Bangladeshi migrants into Assam. The state shares a 262 km border with Bangladesh of which 92 km is riverine. The logistical difficulties to set in place a foolproof border fence have been a strong obstacle for the Border Security Force (BSF) to check illegal migration inflows from Bangladesh. Illegal migrants are estimated to be around 6 million in Assam. The continuation of the immigration influx would not only destabilize Assam's socio-cultural and political parameters but also enable external actors like Pakistan and China to influence events in the Northeast. The United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) has established strong linkages with Pakistan's Inter Service Intelligence (ISI) and has shifted base to Bangladesh after the Royal Bhutan Army destroyed ULFA training camps in Bhutan in 2004. In fact, the ULFA has given up its earlier anti-illegal Bangladeshi migrants' stand on account of the bases provided to them by Bangladesh. Given that, the SC's decision is the right step towards strengthening internal legal procedures in dealing with a politically volatile issue within Assam.
The killing of Kasula Suryanarayana, an Indian telecommunications engineer working for a Bahrain based firm in the Zabul Province of Afghanistan raises important questions on the emerging challenges to India's efforts at reconstruction and stabilization of a "nascent democracy". Suryanarayana was reportedly abducted by the Taliban on April 28 and his abductors linked his safe release to the withdrawal of all Indians working in Afghanistan. Even before the Indian government's special team reached Kabul to negotiate his release, Suryanarayana's beheaded body, with apparent torture marks, was recovered on April 30 at Hassan Kariez district of Zabul, clearly indicating that the Taliban, ever defiant to international norms of engagement, had no intent to negotiate. The message they wanted to convey was one of terror and intimidation.
Suryanarayana's gruesome killing was not the first instance of an Indian falling victim to the increasing attacks on aid workers by the resurgent Taliban. In November 2005, Maniappan Kutty, a driver working with the Border Roads Organisation's project of building the Zaranj-Delaram highway, was abducted and killed by the Taliban. On November 8, 2003, an Indian telecommunications engineer working for the Afghan Wireless Company was shot dead. In 2003, two Indian engineers - P Murali and G Vardharai working on a road project in Zabul province were abducted. Their release three weeks later came about after intense negotiations by Afghan tribal leaders with the Taliban militia, which was demanding the release of 50 imprisoned militants in return for the Indian engineers. Such incidents raise concerns about the safety of Indians working on reconstruction projects in this conflict-ravaged country. Suryanaraya's killing has led to demands that the Indian government provide security to all Indian citizens working in Afghanistan. After Maniappan's killing, the strength of the Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) contingent in Afghanistan was augmented to about 200. New Delhi's proposal of deploying its paramilitary Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) personnel is under consideration by the Afghanistan government.
It is essential to view Suryanarayana's killing in the context of the overall deteriorating security situation in Afghanistan. The US-led efforts at stabilization and reconstruction operations in Afghanistan have long been eclipsed by developments in Iraq since 2003. As a result, the resurgent Taliban is increasingly spreading its tentacles of influence. By targeting development and aid workers, they are impeding reconstruction and at the same time creating fear in the minds of Afghans. A report released by the Council on Foreign Relations provided a grim picture of Afghanistan's security as a country "challenged by a terrorist insurgency that has become more lethal and effective and that has bases in Pakistan, a drug trade that dominates the economy and corrupts the state, and pervasive poverty and insecurity." In the year 2005, about 1,600 people, including 91 US troops, were killed - almost double the total number in 2004. The trend in Afghanistan points to "Iraqisation of Afghanistan," with suicide attacks, a technique alien to Afghan culture, on the rise. Taliban-induced violence is expected to rise this summer as the British-led NATO force gradually takes over control from American troops in the south.
The resurgence of the Taliban is seen especially in areas that share a border with Pakistan. A May 3, 2006 report in the New York Times portrays a grim security situation in Afghanistan, indicating an increase in Taliban activity in provinces like Uruzgan, Helmand, Kandahar, Zabul, Ghazni and Paktika. Zabul province, from where the Taliban cross into Afghanistan via Pachena and Anganay from neighbouring Quetta in Pakistan, is the main route of their movement to the southern provinces. Qalat, the provincial capital of Zabul province, is headed by the Taliban commander Mullah Assadullah. Zabul also elected Mulla Abdul Salaam Rocketi, an ex-Taliban commander, to the Afghan Parliament in September 2005. Likewise, other districts headed by former Taliban are: Dai Chopan district (Mullah Dadullah), Atghar district (Mullah Razaq), Khake Afghan district (Mullah Qahar), Arghandab and Mizan (Amir Khan Haqqani). Due to the support and sanctuary offered by Pakistan to the Taliban, President Karzai has little choice but to accommodate the "moderate Taliban" into the political mainstream through the "Reconciliation Process" and thereby maintain some measure of influence over them. Karzai, during his recent visit to Pakistan in February 2006, provided President Pervez Musharraf with evidence of Islamabad's continued patronage of the Taliban.
The increasing Indian presence in reconstruction activity (1,500 to 2,500 workers) has, however, irked Pakistan and its Afghan protégés. Pakistan has raised objections to India opening consulates in Jalalabad, Herat and Kandahar and is also opposed to India's deployment of paramilitary forces in Afghanistan along areas close to its borders. With instability challenging Islamabad's authority in Balochistan and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), Pakistan has concerns about "Pushtun nationalism" raising its head. In its second annual "failed states" index, Foreign Policy magazine and the Fund for Peace have categorised Pakistan as "another troubled country," which has plunged from 34th on a list of failed states in 2005 to the ninth slot this year (lower than Afghanistan, which ranks 10th in a list of 60 most vulnerable States). Pakistan's inability to quell insurgency in the Pakistan-Afghan border and internal discord are major factors that have led to Pakistan's high score on the Failed States Index.
The recent killing of the Indian engineer as well as similar incidents in the past can also be seen in the context of India's growing and favourable profile in Afghanistan. India, the largest regional donor to Afghanistan, has in the last four years pledged $650 million in a slew of projects. Apart from supplying skilled manpower, constructing roads, hospitals, power transmission lines, the Afghan parliament and other government buildings, the nature of the Indian engagement is broad-based spanning diverse sectors including economy, education, technology, infrastructure, health, education, agriculture, industry, telecommunications, information and broadcasting. During President Karzai's visit to India in April 2006 and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's earlier visit to Afghanistan in August 2005, the two countries decided to strengthen cooperation in economic development and in fighting terrorism. India's engagement with Afghanistan is vital for its ongoing battle against terrorism and curtailing the influence of terror outfits in Jammu and Kashmir - Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT), Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), Harkat-ul-Mujahideen and Harkat ul-Jihad-i-Islami, which derive moral and material support from the trans-border Taliban-Al Qaeda nexus.
In developing a balanced policy response, India should unmistakably signal that there would be no downsizing of the Indian presence in Afghanistan. Any policy movement in that direction would be seen as a victory for the Taliban and could encourage them to indulge in further intimidation. Apart from revamping the security arrangements and sending in more paramilitary forces, India can look towards significantly expanding its assistance in the training and arming of Kabul's security forces, including the Afghan National Army and police. While maintaining its policy of not yielding to the demands of hostage takers, New Delhi needs to strengthen its capacity for information collection, risk assessment and crisis management to deal effectively with similar such crises that could well arise in future. As an important power in the region, India needs to play a key role in the reconstruction and stability in Afghanistan and also in preventing that country from remerging as a "playing ground" for regional powers and their proxies.
Russia is on the move to become an energy superpower by spreading its influence deep into Western and Eastern energy markets. Possessing the largest reserve of natural gas in the world, Russia's domestic and foreign policies have now come to be largely determined by the energy factor. Apart from the already existing market in the West, Moscow's plan to explore Asian markets was welcomed by the major energy consuming countries such as China, Japan, and the Koreas in the East Asian region. But Russia's market expansion plans in Europe against the backdrop of the gas price row with Ukraine in January 2006 and the concurrent supply disruption have appeared as a threat to energy security of the European Union (EU) countries, which have increasingly come to depend on Moscow for their energy supplies. As a consumer bloc, the EU fears that with the market expansion plans Russia would monopolise its own energy market and may eventually gain a greater influence within Europe. Moreover, Russia shifting its attention to Asian markets has also raised concerns, despite the reassurance that it has provided in this regard, about uninterrupted supply of oil and gas to the EU. Consequently, Russia has come to be increasingly seen as an unreliable energy supplier by the Western market. Europe, which has been a traditional market for Russia's energy exports, receives a quarter of its total oil and gas needs form Russia, with the dependency of individual countries variously ranging from about 30 to 50 per cent.
European officials are concerned about Moscow's growing control over energy supply routes and distribution networks within the EU and in the former Soviet Union. In recent times Russia's energy market expansion plans have witnessed some opposition in the European Union. This opposition came in the wake of the Russian energy company Gazprom showing interest in bidding for Centrica, the largest gas distributor in Great Britain. Gazprom, which exports 30 per cent of its natural gas production to the European Union, has responded by warning importing countries that it would cut energy supplies to them and take its business to other markets if Moscow's market expansion plans in EU are curtailed. On April 20, a spokesman for the EU Energy Commissioner reacted to Gazprom's warning thus: "Russia is free to decide its market and EU is already looking for alternative suppliers." On April 24, the Chief of Transneft petroleum company, Semyon Vainshtok even went to the extent of saying that "Europe is overfed with Russian energy and every single economic manual says that excessive supplies depress prices. As soon as we turn towards China, South Korea, Australia, Japan that will immediately take away part of our oil from our European colleagues." Since a major portion of Russia's energy exports are oriented towards the West, energy flows to the European market is at a fairly low price. Russian energy companies believe that their exports are being underpaid for in the current global energy price levels, given that most of the supply deals were inked before prices started skyrocketing in 2003. With this issue heating up between the EU and Russia, a centre-right German Member of the European Parliament Elmar Brok likened Gazprom's threat to "the announcement of a Cold War with new methods."
The war of words has created a sense of caution on both sides and signalled a threat to the energy supply and market security to EU and Moscow, respectively. While the Asian market with China, Japan, the Koreas and India as customers will provide a large and diverse consumer network for Russia, the EU is keen to explore more export sources in the African, Caspian and Persian Gulf regions. During a landmark visit to China on March 21-22, 2006 President Vladimir Putin agreed to the construction of two pipelines from Russia's Far East to supply China with 60 to 80 billion cubic meters of natural gas per annum. Russia also promised to build an oil pipeline from eastern Siberia to its Pacific port of Nakhodka, which will have customers such as China, Japan and other Asian countries. On the other hand, most EU countries have already made large-scale investment in renewable and other alternative energy sources in an attempt to reduce their dependency on Russian energy. Germany, which imports about 30 per cent of its natural gas needs from Russia, recently announced a new energy plan, under which 30 billion Euro each will be invested in the construction of power plants with distribution networks and renewable energy. According to a report in Euobserver, EU leaders agreed that they should establish a single market for electricity and gas by mid-2007, boost renewable energy use by 15 per cent and bio fuel use by 8 per cent by 2015, as well as use 20 per cent less energy overall by 2020.
Ever since the Ukraine episode, the EU has grown worried about its alarming dependency on Russian supplies. It fears that Gazprom's expansion plans in Europe and its growing control of the energy market will force import dependent EU countries to pay a high price for future energy supplies. On the other hand, Moscow feels that its market expansion interests have been ignored or often prevented. Moreover, it also feels that it has been supplying cheap energy to the EU customers, for which prospective consumer countries in the Eastern market are ready to pay a higher price. The fact is that, despite concerns about mutual reliability, Russia and the EU have one of the most important energy trade ties in the world. Statistics show that Russia along with the other countries in the former Soviet Union exported above 5.3 million barrels of oil to the EU in the year 2004. And natural gas exports from Russia alone amounted to 148.44 billion cubic meters out of a total production of 589.10 cubic meters.
Russia and the EU need to look into some of the basic factors which bring them together as energy trading partners, before mutual apprehensions get translated into an energy cold war. First, neither can afford to ignore the other's interests in the current world energy scenario. Given that no other single supplier can replace energy supplies from Russia, EU countries would continue to be dependent on Moscow. At the same time, shifting the energy market completely from the West is an unrealistic option for Russia given that about 70 per cent of Gazprom's revenues come from its natural gas export, while the rest of the gas produced is sold in the domestic market at a low price. Moreover, completely redirecting the West-oriented energy supply and delivery system eastward would require huge financial investments and would also not be economically feasible.
Ever since the Arab Oil embargo, the world has witnessed petroleum fuels being used by producing countries as a political tool to gain leverage in their relations with the outside world and in times of crisis. In the case of Russia too, energy is now a tool to develop its economy and spread its influence in the neighbouring regions. Though the EU and Russia have shared strong energy trade relations for the past many decades, the alarming growth of demand and the growing price of petroleum fuels worldwide along with Moscow's search for more profitable markets in the East and West seem to have adversely affected this relationship. Current tensions between the two sides are unlikely to lead to a cut-off in supply from Russia for the above-mentioned reasons. But at the same time Europe might be forced to pay a higher price for imports from Russia in coming years. Russia's reluctance to ratify the Energy Charter Treaty, which would have helped the already existing consumer countries in terms of supply security and price also demonstrates Moscow's interest in obtaining a higher value for its exports to the EU. Current developments are likely to turn out in favour of Russia asserting itself as an energy superpower with a large consumer network including the EU and North America in the West and Asian consumers in the East.
Nepal is witnessing relative political calm after the Maoists declared a three month ceasefire to facilitate a political solution to the insurgency, which has been marked by unabated violence, threatening peace and stability in the Himalayan Kingdom. The Maoist insurgency, which originated ten years ago in April 1996, has reached a new phase. After several rounds of unsuccessful negotiations to resolve the political crisis posed by the Maoists in the past, the current situation is characterized by anxiety and hope. The anxiety is over whether a peaceful solution can be reached. Hope arises because of the fact that there seems to be a certain convergence of interests between the Seven Party Alliance (SPA) and the Maoists. After nineteen days of demonstrations, initiated by the political parties and supported by the Maoists, the King caved in to the spontaneity of anger expressed against his rule in the streets of Nepal. With the restoration of the suspended Parliament and swearing in of Mr. G P Koirala as the Prime Minister of Nepal, the focus has now shifted to the two main actors - the SPA and the Maoists.
There are difficult tasks in front of the new government headed by G P Koirala. The perceptible uncertainty is evident as the Maoists wait for the government's announcement regarding elections to the Constituent Assembly. The new government has made an appeal to the Maoists to shun violence and give up arms. But the situation remains tricky, with the Maoists reluctant to give up arms before any concrete political settlement. Maoist support to the political process is backed by the twelve-point agreement that they signed with the political parties in November 2005, one of which stated that the political parties would form an interim government and hold elections to a Constituent Assembly. As is evident from various statements emanating from Kathmandu, the political parties have expressed their desire to hold elections to the Constituent Assembly.
Before the forthcoming elections there are certain issues that need to be thrashed out between the SPA and the Maoists. First, the question of disarming the Maoist cadres would be important before an election takes place. The Maoists, as per the agreement, have agreed that they would put their armed cadres along with the Royal Nepal Army (RNA) under some kind of UN or any other reliable international supervision so that there could be free and fair elections. It is likely that the Maoists would not agree to complete disarmament before the elections because of the existence of a trust deficit between the parties to the conflict. Therefore in their twelve-point agreement both the political parties and the Maoists have categorically stated that they expect reliable international mediation even during the dialogue process. The Maoists need to be convinced that the government is committed to an elected Constituent Assembly. As for the SPA, it needs to be convinced that the Maoists believe in the democratic process and would accept the outcome of the elections to the Constituent Assembly and their drafted constitution. It also seems impossible that the Maoists, without a credible commitment, perhaps an international guarantee, would give up their armed wing.
The Communist Party of India and its leaders played an important role in forging an agreement between the Maoists and the SPA. They were also instrumental in convincing the Maoists to declare a three-month ceasefire. How far the Indian Communist leaders would be able to convince the Maoists to adhere to the constitutional path remains to be seen. Given their recent positive role, they could indeed play a crucial part in Nepal's unfolding political future. At the same time, the Maoists want to give peace a chance due to international pressure.
The most important issue before the Constituent Assembly would be the future role of the King. It is difficult to believe that the Palace would remain a silent spectator and accept the decision of the Constituent Assembly about its future. The King still holds immense powers under the 1990 constitution and is in a position to dismiss the government using the controversial Article 127. He will remain the Supreme Commander of the armed forces until the new constitution of Nepal is written. He is an important third party and would try to retain a certain political role instead of simply being relegated to the role of a ceremonial monarch. Both the political parties and the Maoists have indicated that the future role of the King would depend on what the people of Nepal want. The existing situation is that there is certainly a consensus among the people regarding a less intrusive monarch, though perhaps people are not yet prepared for a Republic. The Monarchy as an institution still has socio-political relevance.
There is a need on the part of the political parties and the Maoists to tread carefully. They have been able to marginalize the King and there exists popular support for their efforts to draw up a new constitution. If the negotiation proves to be a long drawn one or if the Maoists leave the constitutional path, the King's position will get strengthened. Any failure on the part of the political parties could inevitably lead to the King's assumption of power. With the SPA in the process of consolidating power, the Maoists are waiting patiently for political progress along the agreed line.
India is waiting cautiously for the next political move of the Koirala government. It is also going to watch anxiously how the SPA and the Maoists work out the necessary modalities for an election to the Constituent Assembly. At the same time India is equally apprehensive that Nepal would face a deeper political crisis if the Maoists and the SPA do not reach an understanding. This will not only impinge on the credibility of the parties as political actors but in turn would strengthen the institution of the Monarchy. It is important to ensure that the Maoists do not use the cease-fire period to strengthen their armed wing and prepare for another phase of armed struggle. The resultant instability would have grave security implications for India, which shares a 1700 km open border with Nepal.
Despite the King's proclamation and the subsequent end to the 19-day anti-Monarchy protests by the seven party alliance (SPA) on April 25, 2006, Nepal is still not sure of peace and stability. The difference between the SPA and the Maoists on the new constitution seems to be the biggest challenge before the Koirala Government. Although the Maoists have declared a three-month ceasefire, they have refused to surrender their weapons before or during the elections to a Constituent Assembly. However, the decision of the Nepal Workers and Peasants Party, a partner in the SPA, not to join the Council of Ministers could affect the peace talks with the Maoists.
On the night of April 24, King Gyanendra had yielded to unrelenting pressure from the pro-democracy movement and announced that the Parliament, which he dissolved in 2002, had been revived. He convened the parliament on April 28. The SPA, which spearheaded the movement for democracy, was quick to welcome the King's declaration and accepted the Royal offer. Earlier on November 22, 2005, the CPN-Maoist and Nepal's political parties had reached a 12-point agreement, which called for joint action to end the autocratic monarchy and bring about fair elections to a constituent assembly.
The international community, which criticized the King for violation of human rights during the nineteen-day protest period as well as the King's takeover of power in February 2005, welcomed the King's declarations. India welcomed the King's decision to revive Parliament and hoped that an interim government would be in place in Nepal soon. On April 25, Defence Minister Pranab Mukherjee said: "We await the convening of the revived House of Representatives and the installation of a government as indicated by the Seven Party Alliance. This is a victory for the people of Nepal, who have displayed extraordinary courage and reaffirmed their faith and commitment to freedom and democracy. The future of Nepal is safe in their hands."
The US, the European Union and China also welcomed the King's decision, which was a direct result of India's diplomatic initiative. On April 20, Dr. Karan Singh was despatched as special envoy to Nepal, where he called on the leaders of the SPA and the King. India's effort to bring peace and stability in Nepal continues. The Communist Party of India (Marxist) leader, Sitaram Yechuri, has gone to Nepal to discuss with SPA leaders the issue of formation of the interim government and elections to the constituent assembly. He would also hold talks with the Maoist leader Baburam Bhattarai. Earlier, Nepal's Prime Minister-designate Girija Prasad Koirala had sought Yechury's help in ironing out differences between the SPA and the Maoists.
However, India is concerned about the Maoist decision. They had betrayed their ceasefire declarations in the past and used the time to replenish their weapons. The Nepal revolutionary movement has now entered its strategic offensive phase and the CPN-Maoists linkages have remained a major concern to India.
The CPI-Maoists appear to have worked out a strategic alliance with the CPN-Maoists to carve out a Compact Revolutionary Zone (CRZ) comprising areas from Kathmandu to the southern tip of Andhra Pradesh. They have also formed the Indo-Nepal Border Region Committee to co-ordinate their activities in North Bihar and along the India-Nepal border.
In this regard, on April 14 in New Delhi, at the meeting of the Chief Ministers of Maoist-infested States, Bihar's Nitish Kumar and Chhattisgarh's Raman Singh said there was immediate danger of CPN-Maoist cadres crossing over to India and making Naxalism a nationwide phenomenon. Conceding that Maoists from Nepal posed a serious threat, the Union Home Ministry, which till now had been hinting at 'ideological links' between CPI-Maoist and CPN-Maoist cadres, admitted that the two outfits provided training, arms and finances to each other.
The CPN-Maoists procure arms and ammunition from criminal gangs in the neighbouring Indian states of Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal, with which Nepal shares an open border, as well as from insurgent groups operating in the northeast region of India. The primary route used by the CPN-Maoists for smuggling weapons and explosives from the Indian border is the Belauri checkpoint of Kanchanpur district and Melauli checkpoint at the border of Dadeldhura and Baitadi districts, then to Bajura district and finally to Achham district of Nepal.
Interestingly, CPN-Maoist is a member of RIM (Revolutionary Internationalist Movement), and RIM believes in ultimate victory against imperialism, feudalism and globalization and the establishment of a communist society. Both outfits are part of the Coordination Committee of Maoist Parties and Organization of South Asia (CCOMPOSA), and the Nepal Maoists openly declare that unless the Maoists of the South Asian region work jointly to counter 'the pernicious role of India' final victory would elude them.
At this juncture, India should continue to keep its present diplomatic channel open for mediating between the King and the political parties and discuss the future course of action without being seen as interfering in the country's internal affairs. India should ask the SPA to negotiate with the Maoists to surrender the People's Liberation Army and its arms to the civilian government and co-operate in reconstruction and development activities. Secondly, India and donor countries have to play a major role in reconstruction and development works. Priority should be given to strengthening democratic institutions and good governance. Otherwise, there is likely to be a relapse of the Maoist movement in Nepal.
The fast breeding domestic debate on the size of the nuclear deterrent is taking place in the light of India's separation plan of nuclear facilities for civilian and military purposes. The scope of the debate related to India's credible minimum deterrence is complex with reference to the continuing relevance of the role of nuclear weapons in military strategies worldwide both at the conceptual and operational levels.
India is committed to accelerating the pace of civil nuclear energy production and increasing the share of civilian nuclear power in country's energy mix. Independent of international support to its civilian nuclear needs, India's quest for credible minimum deterrence would continue. At the same time, periodical review of strength of the strategic forces would remain relevant for defence preparedness.
How willing is the international community to integrate India into the prevailing nuclear trade arrangements would be seen in the implementation of the US-India nuclear deal. However, the international community cannot overlook India's position vis-à-vis the security realities of the international environment.
For almost five decades, the Cold War world witnessed a race for development and deployment of nuclear weapons under a grand dilemma - the possibility of 'use' or 'non-use' of nuclear weapons in any eventual military crisis. Had there been no review by major nuclear weapon states on the doctrines simply based on 'mutual assured destruction', the search for alternatives like limited, flexible or proportionate deterrent capabilities would not have started.
The process of review in diversifying the role of nuclear weapons itself led to changes in the size and nature of nuclear arsenals worldwide. The task of the military strategists also became complicated in terms of 'what type' and 'how many' numbers should be considered as sufficient for deterrence. The emphasis on numbers thus became significant.
Though the phase of bipolar rivalry between the Warsaw Pact and NATO has ended, stocks, albeit reduced, of their nuclear arsenals still exist. The efforts of N-5 states (nuclear weapon states as defined by the NPT) are now being channelised to develop cutting edge technologies. The emphasis is on enhancing the credibility of individual deterrent capabilities.
The continuing rationality for possession of nuclear weapons is still premised on the unpredictability of threat vulnerabilities. In the realm of realism, threat perceptions and force projections still remain as significant dimensions to validate the existence of deterrence. The complexity in conceptualizing nuclear deterrence arises due to the changing nature of security perceptions of states with nuclear weapons in the context of their own force capabilities.
While contesting about theoretical constructs on deterrence, in practice each country attempts to take adequate measures to ensure survivability of its existing arsenal. The survivability factor becomes more important for a country like India, which follows a doctrine of no-first-use (NFU). In addition to targeting strategies, therefore, numbers do matter in creating deterrence.
India faces security challenges primarily from two nuclear neighbours - Pakistan and China. In addition to an active fissile material production programme, Pakistan has not yet officially defined its doctrinal position and maintains ambiguity about its nuclear first-strike option. On the other hand, China holds a reserve of sufficient fissile stock to expand the size of its arsenal two to three times of its existing stockpile. As far as its deterrence strategy is concerned, Beijing maintains a qualified doctrine of NFU with 'limited deterrence'.
To uphold NFU and withstand a potential first-strike, India needs to address appropriately the number calculations, including for worst-case scenarios. At present India may have a slight edge over Pakistan's stock of weapons, but the Chinese fissile stockpile is estimated by nuclear experts to be many times that of India's. Military strategists can hardy afford to underrate the potential contingencies in terms of the survivability, which makes numbers matter.
In the international security calculus, the potential nuclear strategies of the N-5 seem at odds with their commitments for nuclear disarmament. The Bush Administration is determined to pursue a new deterrence policy. Its new nuclear posture envisages force preparedness against perceived threats at asymmetric levels of deterrence. Russia intends to develop and deploy new ICBMs, a new class of submarines and cruise missiles. Even France and UK are on advancement modes. France is currently engaged in the development of new nuclear powered submarines and the UK seems to be in need of replenishing its Trident systems. In the given scenario, it is pertinent for India to gauge the temperature in China as well. China's continuing efforts to modernize its missile forces will have long term security implications for India.
To establish even credible minimum deterrence against China, India needs to closely follow the dynamism attached to the notions of deterrence elsewhere in the world, which in turn affects China. Here again, numbers have a role to play.
At the operational level, the credibility of nuclear deterrence is viewed mainly through three aspects - weapons-grade fissile stock, delivery systems, and command and control mechanisms. Throughout the cold war, the five nuclear weapon states produced tons of weapons-grade fissile material and developed a wide range of missiles and bombers to meet any eventuality. The deployment strategies of the rival blocks in potential war theatres necessitated the installation of elaborate command and control systems.
Despite their deployments in own security conditions, countries like China and India can hardly afford to ignore the importance of reliable command and control systems.
Under these given complexities, India needs to go a long way in creating a credible minimum nuclear deterrent capability. The task ahead also includes, therefore, appropriately addressing the issue of number of nuclear weapons and fissile stock.
Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh concluded his two-day state visit to Uzbekistan on April 26, 2006. This was the second visit by an Indian Prime Minister to Tashkent since Uzbekistan's independence in August 1991. India and Uzbekistan signed seven agreements in the fields of energy, business, education, mineral prospecting and stepping up the joint fight against international terrorism, religious extremism and drug trafficking. This has undoubtedly increased Indian stakes in Central Asia.
Dr. Singh's visit has been a historic one as far as cooperation in the energy sector is concerned. Of the seven new agreements signed on April 26, three agreements specifying India's role in Uzbekistan's energy and mineral sectors are of particular importance. These provide exploration acreages to Indian companies without bidding, in return for an equal share in the revenue from any discovery. The significance of these three agreements arises from the fact that Uzbekistan is estimated to have 594 million barrels of proven oil reserves and an estimated 65-70 trillion cubic feet of natural gas reserves. Uzbekistan is the second largest natural gas producer in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) after Russia.
These agreements also mark a change in India's fortune in Central Asia. India's efforts to secure a niche for itself in Central Asian hydrocarbons have so far been unsuccessful. New Delhi had earlier tried to secure a share in the Kurmangazy field of Kazakhstan, but lost to China. The new agreements mark a breakthrough and will help ONGC Videsh and the Gas Authority of India Limited to put their plans of investment in Uzbekistan and Central Asia on the fast track. As far as increasing the share of nuclear energy in the Indian energy basket is concerned, one would like to see more cooperation between New Delhi and Tashkent. Uzbekistan is reported to have vast quantities of uranium. India needs to examine the option of buying uranium from Tashkent for its nuclear energy production requirements.
Conventional wisdom in India does not consider Central Asian energy resources seriously, pointing to the difficulties associated with transportation. In this regard, the realization of a transport corridor has to be pursued vigorously. Uzbekistan could be an important connecting point in this transport corridor. The new route connecting India to Central Asia via Mumbai - Chah Bahar - Zaranj - Delaran - Heart - Naibabad - Khairaton - Termez and further has high potential for success. India's Border Road Organisation has been building roads on this route, which is likely to be operational sooner than later. However, the threats from terrorists and extremists are still looming large on this route given the fact that the Taliban and their counterparts in Pakistan would not like to see regional cooperation picking up between Central and South Asia.
This brings in to focus the role of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and the Islamic Movement of Turkistan (IMT) in the current political space of the region. Both groups have been waging wars against secular governments. Their "struggle" is aimed at establishing an Islamic Caliphate in the region comprising Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Xinjiang. There is credible information to indicate that some extremist elements from the Central Asian Republics have been found operating side-by-side with Pakistani militants in Jammu & Kashmir. There is a nexus between IMU-IMT and the Jamaat-e-Islami of Pakistan, Taliban and Al Qaeda. It is not in India's security interests to be a mute witness to the revival and growth of religious extremism in Central Asia. New Delhi and Tashkent share common concerns over threats from religious extremism and cross-border terrorism.
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and President Karimov identified drug trafficking, international terrorism, religious extremism and cross border terrorism as common threats faced by their nations. Opium production in Afghanistan accounts for 80 per cent of global output. And drug trafficking in Afghanistan has been the fountainhead of terrorist financing in the Central and South Asian regions. At the joint press conference on April 26, 2006 in Tashkent, President Karimov supported the Indian policy to eliminate these threats. Tashkent has been supportive of India's stance on various regional and international issues, like for instance the reconstruction programme in Afghanistan and the fight against international terrorism. The Indian experience in fighting terrorism and insurgencies could be of utility to Uzbekistan given the number of hot spots in the Ferghana Valley and other parts of Uzbekistan. In particular, the Indian experience with the use of Central Police Organisations and paramilitary forces is likely to be of considerable value to Tashkent.
President Karimov once again reiterated his country's support to India's permanent membership in the United Nations Security Council and to the resolution of the Jammu & Kashmir issue through bilateral talks between New Delhi and Islamabad. Tashkent completely ruled out a role for any third party either as mediator or facilitator for resolving the Jammu & Kashmir issue.
There have been a few trend-setting developments in the Central Asian geo-political landscape such as 9/11, the "Tulip Revolution" of March 2004 in Kyrgyzstan and the May 2005 developments in Andijon, Uzbekistan. While 9/11 provided an opportunity to the United States to get a foothold in the Central Asian region, the other two events have put US policy towards Central Asia in jeopardy. The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) Summit in Astana in July last year gave a clear message to the United States to wind down its military bases from the territories of its member states. The US had had to consequently depart from the Karshi-Khanabad base in Uzbekistan.
It is against this backdrop that India needs to play a proactive role in the prevailing geo-political situation in Central Asia. The region has been termed as 'extended neighbourhood' in the Indian strategic calculus. New Delhi has tremendous goodwill compared to any other major player in the region and is considered a benign neighbour. The Indian PM's visit to Tashkent has been a step forward in the right direction.
Another agreement signed on April 26, 2006 is for establishing the Uzbekistan-India Entrepreneurship Development Centre in Tashkent. This is a step forward in increasing economic ties between the two countries. The inauguration of the Jawaharlal Nehru Information Technology Centre in Tashkent by the Indian PM on April 26, 2006 is an important milestone as far as projecting Indian excellence in IT is concerned. Information Technology, hydrocarbons, North-South transport corridor, deepening of bilateral cooperation in the areas of small and medium scale business and tourism appear to be candidate areas in Indo-Uzbek economic cooperation with high potential for success.
Other steps that need to be taken to facilitate the expansion and strengthening of economic cooperation between New Delhi and Tashkent include the re-opening of a branch of the State Bank of India or the Punjab National Bank in Tashkent for efficient and cost-effective commercial transactions. Secondly, there is a firm need to establish an office of the CII/FICCI/ASSOCHAM for liaison and facilitation functions. In the soft power arena, India could consider extending professional assistance to restore Uzbek films, which are now stored in Moscow. The production of films in Russian/Uzbek and Hindi through joint Indo-Uzbek endeavours is also worthy of serious support.
